000			01438nas a2200229Ia 4500
008			250101c99999999xx |||||||||||| ||und||
022			_a1945-7731
100			_aHeller, Sara B. _9124387
245		0	_aInformation Frictions and Skill Signaling in the Youth Labor Market
260			_bAmerican Economic Journal: Economic Policy
260			_c2024
300			_a01-33
520			_aThis paper provides evidence that information frictions limit the labor market trajectories of US youth. We provide credible skill signals-recommendation letters based on supervisor feedback-to a random subset of 43,409 participants in New York's summer jobs program. Letters increase employment the following year by 3 percentage points (4.5 percent). Earnings effects grow over four years to a cumulative _1,349 (4.9 percent). We find little evidence of increased job search or confidence; instead, signals may help employers better identify successful matches with high-productivity workers. Pulling youth into the labor market can, however, hamper on-time graduation, especially among low-achieving students.
650			_a Child Care _913939
650			_a Labor Productivity _9123715
650			_a Mechanism Design _960338
650			_a Public Pensions _9124388
650			_a Wage Differentials _91731
650			_aHuman Capital
700			_a Kessler, Judd B. _9124389
856			_uhttps://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20220544
999			_c134756 _d134756